Monotonicity and implementability

Itai Ashlagi; Mark Braverman; Avinatan Hassidim; Dov Monderer

doi:10.3982/ECTA8882

Monotonicity and implementability

Itai Ashlagi, Mark Braverman, Avinatan Hassidim, Dov Monderer

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › peer-review

44 Scopus citations

Abstract

Consider an environment with a finite number of alternatives, and agents with private values and quasilinear utility functions. A domain of valuation functions for an agent is a monotonicity domain if every finite valued monotone randomized allocation rule defined on it is implementable in dominant strategies. We fully characterize the set of all monotonicity domains.

Original language	English (US)
Pages (from-to)	1749-1772
Number of pages	24
Journal	Econometrica
Volume	78
Issue number	5
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.3982/ECTA8882
State	Published - Sep 2010
Externally published	Yes

All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes

Economics and Econometrics

Keywords

Cyclic monotonicity
Dominant strategies
Implementable
Monotone

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10.3982/ECTA8882

Cite this

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abstract = "Consider an environment with a finite number of alternatives, and agents with private values and quasilinear utility functions. A domain of valuation functions for an agent is a monotonicity domain if every finite valued monotone randomized allocation rule defined on it is implementable in dominant strategies. We fully characterize the set of all monotonicity domains.",

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author = "Itai Ashlagi and Mark Braverman and Avinatan Hassidim and Dov Monderer",

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AU - Ashlagi, Itai

AU - Braverman, Mark

AU - Hassidim, Avinatan

AU - Monderer, Dov

PY - 2010/9

Y1 - 2010/9

N2 - Consider an environment with a finite number of alternatives, and agents with private values and quasilinear utility functions. A domain of valuation functions for an agent is a monotonicity domain if every finite valued monotone randomized allocation rule defined on it is implementable in dominant strategies. We fully characterize the set of all monotonicity domains.

AB - Consider an environment with a finite number of alternatives, and agents with private values and quasilinear utility functions. A domain of valuation functions for an agent is a monotonicity domain if every finite valued monotone randomized allocation rule defined on it is implementable in dominant strategies. We fully characterize the set of all monotonicity domains.

KW - Cyclic monotonicity

KW - Dominant strategies

KW - Implementable

KW - Monotone

UR - https://www.scopus.com/pages/publications/78649430492

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DO - 10.3982/ECTA8882

M3 - Article

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VL - 78

SP - 1749

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JO - Econometrica

JF - Econometrica

IS - 5

ER -

Monotonicity and implementability

Abstract

All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes

Keywords

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