Monotonicity and implementability

Itai Ashlagi, Mark Braverman, Avinatan Hassidim, Dov Monderer

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

41 Scopus citations


Consider an environment with a finite number of alternatives, and agents with private values and quasilinear utility functions. A domain of valuation functions for an agent is a monotonicity domain if every finite valued monotone randomized allocation rule defined on it is implementable in dominant strategies. We fully characterize the set of all monotonicity domains.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)1749-1772
Number of pages24
Issue number5
StatePublished - Sep 2010
Externally publishedYes

All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes

  • Economics and Econometrics


  • Cyclic monotonicity
  • Dominant strategies
  • Implementable
  • Monotone


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