Models of vetoes and veto bargaining

Research output: Contribution to journalReview articlepeer-review

63 Scopus citations


Models of veto bargaining have become an important tool for formal institutional analysis. This chapter reviews the core model of veto bargaining and some of its more interesting and useful extensions, focusing on one of the best developed applications, the presidential veto over legislation. One of the primary attractions of these models is that they often produce crisp, testable empirical predictions. Our review focuses on 18 such predictions. We conclude with a brief review of the empirical evidence related to these hypotheses.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)409-435
Number of pages27
JournalAnnual Review of Political Science
StatePublished - 2004
Externally publishedYes

All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes

  • Sociology and Political Science


  • Executive-legislative relations
  • Gridlock
  • Presidents
  • Separation of powers


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