Mental states are more important in evaluating moral than conventional violations

Carly Giffin, Tania Lombrozo

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference contribution

1 Scopus citations

Abstract

A perpetrator's mental state - whether she had mens rea or a “guilty mind” - typically plays an important role in evaluating wrongness and assigning punishment. In two experiments, we find that this role for mental states is weaker in evaluating conventional violations relative to moral violations. We also find that this diminished role for mental states may be associated with the fact that conventional violations are wrong by virtue of having violated a (potentially arbitrary) rule, whereas moral violations are also wrong inherently.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Title of host publicationProceedings of the 37th Annual Meeting of the Cognitive Science Society, CogSci 2015
EditorsDavid C. Noelle, Rick Dale, Anne Warlaumont, Jeff Yoshimi, Teenie Matlock, Carolyn D. Jennings, Paul P. Maglio
PublisherThe Cognitive Science Society
Pages800-805
Number of pages6
ISBN (Electronic)9780991196722
StatePublished - 2015
Event37th Annual Meeting of the Cognitive Science Society: Mind, Technology, and Society, CogSci 2015 - Pasadena, United States
Duration: Jul 23 2015Jul 25 2015

Publication series

NameProceedings of the 37th Annual Meeting of the Cognitive Science Society, CogSci 2015

Conference

Conference37th Annual Meeting of the Cognitive Science Society: Mind, Technology, and Society, CogSci 2015
Country/TerritoryUnited States
CityPasadena
Period7/23/157/25/15

All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes

  • Artificial Intelligence
  • Computer Science Applications
  • Human-Computer Interaction
  • Cognitive Neuroscience

Keywords

  • decision making
  • mental states
  • moral evaluation
  • punishment
  • violations

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