@inproceedings{1d2da2c20dac4a64947be23dd4a5414f,
title = "Matching with couples revisited",
abstract = "It is well known that a stable matching in a many-to-one matching market with couples need not exist. We introduce a new matching algorithm for such markets and show that for large random markets the algorithm will find a stable matching with high probability. In our model we allow the number of couples to grow at a near-linear rate. Furthermore, truth-telling is an approximated equilibrium in the game induced by the new matching algorithm. Our results are tight: for markets in which the number of couples grows at a linear rate, we show that with constant probability no stable matching exists.",
keywords = "market design, matching",
author = "Itai Ashlagi and Mark Braverman and Avinatan Hassidim",
year = "2011",
doi = "10.1145/1993574.1993628",
language = "English (US)",
isbn = "9781450302616",
series = "Proceedings of the ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce",
pages = "335",
booktitle = "EC'11 - Proceedings of the 12th ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce",
note = "12th ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce, EC'11 ; Conference date: 05-06-2011 Through 09-06-2011",
}