Matching with couples revisited

Itai Ashlagi, Mark Braverman, Avinatan Hassidim

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference contribution

6 Scopus citations


It is well known that a stable matching in a many-to-one matching market with couples need not exist. We introduce a new matching algorithm for such markets and show that for large random markets the algorithm will find a stable matching with high probability. In our model we allow the number of couples to grow at a near-linear rate. Furthermore, truth-telling is an approximated equilibrium in the game induced by the new matching algorithm. Our results are tight: for markets in which the number of couples grows at a linear rate, we show that with constant probability no stable matching exists.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Title of host publicationEC'11 - Proceedings of the 12th ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce
Number of pages1
StatePublished - 2011
Externally publishedYes
Event12th ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce, EC'11 - San Jose, CA, United States
Duration: Jun 5 2011Jun 9 2011

Publication series

NameProceedings of the ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce


Other12th ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce, EC'11
Country/TerritoryUnited States
CitySan Jose, CA

All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes

  • Software
  • Computer Science Applications
  • Computer Networks and Communications


  • market design
  • matching

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