Learning efficient satisfaction equilibria via trial and error

Samir M. Perlaza, H. Vincent Poor, Zhu Han

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference contribution

5 Scopus citations

Abstract

In this paper, the problem of quality-of-service (QoS) provisioning is formulated as a game in satisfaction form. The corresponding solution is shown to be either a satisfaction equilibrium (SE), an efficient satisfaction equilibrium (ESE) or a non-equilibrium solution in which the largest population of players are satisfied (N-person satisfaction point, N-PSP). The main two contributions are: (i) A family of functions whose global maximizers are either an ESE, an SE or an N-PSP depending on their existence; and (ii) a fully distributed algorithm that allows the achievability of the above equilibria or non-equilibrium configurations via the decentralized maximization of these functions. In particular, the construction of such functions ensures the convergence of the proposed algorithm to stochastically stable solutions. This property is shown to be independent of the topology of the network or the specific individual QoS constraints.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Title of host publicationConference Record of the 46th Asilomar Conference on Signals, Systems and Computers, ASILOMAR 2012
Pages676-680
Number of pages5
DOIs
StatePublished - Dec 1 2012
Externally publishedYes
Event46th Asilomar Conference on Signals, Systems and Computers, ASILOMAR 2012 - Pacific Grove, CA, United States
Duration: Nov 4 2012Nov 7 2012

Publication series

NameConference Record - Asilomar Conference on Signals, Systems and Computers
ISSN (Print)1058-6393

Other

Other46th Asilomar Conference on Signals, Systems and Computers, ASILOMAR 2012
CountryUnited States
CityPacific Grove, CA
Period11/4/1211/7/12

All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes

  • Signal Processing
  • Computer Networks and Communications

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    Perlaza, S. M., Poor, H. V., & Han, Z. (2012). Learning efficient satisfaction equilibria via trial and error. In Conference Record of the 46th Asilomar Conference on Signals, Systems and Computers, ASILOMAR 2012 (pp. 676-680). [6489096] (Conference Record - Asilomar Conference on Signals, Systems and Computers). https://doi.org/10.1109/ACSSC.2012.6489096