TY - GEN
T1 - LARGE LANGUAGE MODELS ASSUME PEOPLE ARE MORE RATIONAL THAN WE REALLY ARE
AU - Liu, Ryan
AU - Geng, Jiayi
AU - Peterson, Joshua C.
AU - Sucholutsky, Ilia
AU - Griffiths, Thomas L.
N1 - Publisher Copyright:
© 2025 13th International Conference on Learning Representations, ICLR 2025. All rights reserved.
PY - 2025
Y1 - 2025
N2 - In order for AI systems to communicate effectively with people, they must understand how we make decisions. However, people's decisions are not always rational, so the implicit internal models of human decision-making in Large Language Models (LLMs) must account for this. Previous empirical evidence seems to suggest that these implicit models are accurate - LLMs offer believable proxies of human behavior, acting how we expect humans would in everyday interactions. However, by comparing LLM behavior and predictions to a large dataset of human decisions, we find that this is actually not the case: when both simulating and predicting people's choices, a suite of cutting-edge LLMs (GPT-4o & 4-Turbo, Llama-3-8B & 70B, Claude 3 Opus) assume that people are more rational than we really are. Specifically, these models deviate from human behavior and align more closely with a classic model of rational choice - expected value theory. Interestingly, people also tend to assume that other people are rational when interpreting their behavior. As a consequence, when we compare the inferences that LLMs and people draw from the decisions of others using another psychological dataset, we find that these inferences are highly correlated. Thus, the implicit decision-making models of LLMs appear to be aligned with the human expectation that other people will act rationally, rather than with how people actually act.
AB - In order for AI systems to communicate effectively with people, they must understand how we make decisions. However, people's decisions are not always rational, so the implicit internal models of human decision-making in Large Language Models (LLMs) must account for this. Previous empirical evidence seems to suggest that these implicit models are accurate - LLMs offer believable proxies of human behavior, acting how we expect humans would in everyday interactions. However, by comparing LLM behavior and predictions to a large dataset of human decisions, we find that this is actually not the case: when both simulating and predicting people's choices, a suite of cutting-edge LLMs (GPT-4o & 4-Turbo, Llama-3-8B & 70B, Claude 3 Opus) assume that people are more rational than we really are. Specifically, these models deviate from human behavior and align more closely with a classic model of rational choice - expected value theory. Interestingly, people also tend to assume that other people are rational when interpreting their behavior. As a consequence, when we compare the inferences that LLMs and people draw from the decisions of others using another psychological dataset, we find that these inferences are highly correlated. Thus, the implicit decision-making models of LLMs appear to be aligned with the human expectation that other people will act rationally, rather than with how people actually act.
UR - https://www.scopus.com/pages/publications/105010185810
UR - https://www.scopus.com/pages/publications/105010185810#tab=citedBy
M3 - Conference contribution
AN - SCOPUS:105010185810
T3 - 13th International Conference on Learning Representations, ICLR 2025
SP - 28193
EP - 28219
BT - 13th International Conference on Learning Representations, ICLR 2025
PB - International Conference on Learning Representations, ICLR
T2 - 13th International Conference on Learning Representations, ICLR 2025
Y2 - 24 April 2025 through 28 April 2025
ER -