KANT ON THEORETICAL (OR ‘DOCTRINAL’) BELIEF AND THE STATUS OF METAPHYSICS

Kant was much more liberal regarding the status of conclusions in traditional metaphysics than most commentators have thought. To defend this thesis, I first analyze the notion of “doctrinal” or “theoretical” belief (Glaube) as it appears in the first Critique and other writings, and then eXplore some key eXamples. The main focus in this paper is the cosmological inference to an “ultimate ground” – I argue that although the inference fails to provide knowledge (Wissen), for Kant, it is still a legitimate object of firm theoretical belief (Glaube). Kant’s Leibnizean-Wolffian opponents would not have appreciated this epistemic downgrade to their results, but contemporary metaphysicians are likely to be fine with it. Kant is not the great enemy of metaphysics that he is sometimes made out to be.