Judicial lobbying: The politics of labor law constitutional interpretation

Matias Iaryczower, Pablo T. Spiller, Mariano Tommasi

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

26 Scopus citations


This paper links the theory of interest groups influence over the legislature with that of congressional control over the judiciary. The resulting framework reconciles the theoretical literature of lobbying with the negative available evidence on the impact of lobbying over legislative outcomes, and sheds light to the determinants of lobbying in separation-of-powers systems. We provide conditions for judicial decisions to be sensitive to legislative lobbying, and find that lobbying falls the more divided the legislature is on the relevant issues. We apply this framework to analyze supreme court labor decisions in Argentina, and find results consistent with the predictions of the theory.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)85-97
Number of pages13
JournalAmerican Political Science Review
Issue number1
StatePublished - Feb 2006
Externally publishedYes

All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes

  • Sociology and Political Science
  • Political Science and International Relations


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