Joint-search theory: New opportunities and new frictions

Bulent Guler; Fatih Guvenen; Giovanni L. Violante

doi:10.1016/j.jmoneco.2012.05.001

Joint-search theory: New opportunities and new frictions

Bulent Guler
, Fatih Guvenen
, Giovanni L. Violante

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › peer-review

36 Scopus citations

Abstract

The job-search problem of couples differs in significant ways from that of singles. We characterize the reservation wage strategies of a couple that perfectly pools income to understand the ramifications of joint search for individual labor market outcomes. Two cases are analyzed. First, when couples are risk averse and pool income, joint search yields new opportunities relative to single-agent search. Second, when spouses receive job offers from multiple locations and incur a cost when living apart, joint search features new frictions and can lead to worse outcomes than single-agent search.

Original language	English (US)
Pages (from-to)	352-369
Number of pages	18
Journal	Journal of Monetary Economics
Volume	59
Issue number	4
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jmoneco.2012.05.001
State	Published - May 2012
Externally published	Yes

All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes

Finance
Economics and Econometrics

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10.1016/j.jmoneco.2012.05.001

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title = "Joint-search theory: New opportunities and new frictions",

abstract = "The job-search problem of couples differs in significant ways from that of singles. We characterize the reservation wage strategies of a couple that perfectly pools income to understand the ramifications of joint search for individual labor market outcomes. Two cases are analyzed. First, when couples are risk averse and pool income, joint search yields new opportunities relative to single-agent search. Second, when spouses receive job offers from multiple locations and incur a cost when living apart, joint search features new frictions and can lead to worse outcomes than single-agent search.",

author = "Bulent Guler and Fatih Guvenen and Violante, \{Giovanni L.\}",

note = "Funding Information: The authors would like to thank seminar participants at various seminars and conferences. Chris Huckfeldt and Cloe Ortiz de Mendivil provided excellent research assistance. Guvenen acknowledges financial support from the NSF under grant number SES-0351001 . ",

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doi = "10.1016/j.jmoneco.2012.05.001",

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T2 - New opportunities and new frictions

AU - Guler, Bulent

AU - Guvenen, Fatih

AU - Violante, Giovanni L.

N1 - Funding Information: The authors would like to thank seminar participants at various seminars and conferences. Chris Huckfeldt and Cloe Ortiz de Mendivil provided excellent research assistance. Guvenen acknowledges financial support from the NSF under grant number SES-0351001 .

PY - 2012/5

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N2 - The job-search problem of couples differs in significant ways from that of singles. We characterize the reservation wage strategies of a couple that perfectly pools income to understand the ramifications of joint search for individual labor market outcomes. Two cases are analyzed. First, when couples are risk averse and pool income, joint search yields new opportunities relative to single-agent search. Second, when spouses receive job offers from multiple locations and incur a cost when living apart, joint search features new frictions and can lead to worse outcomes than single-agent search.

AB - The job-search problem of couples differs in significant ways from that of singles. We characterize the reservation wage strategies of a couple that perfectly pools income to understand the ramifications of joint search for individual labor market outcomes. Two cases are analyzed. First, when couples are risk averse and pool income, joint search yields new opportunities relative to single-agent search. Second, when spouses receive job offers from multiple locations and incur a cost when living apart, joint search features new frictions and can lead to worse outcomes than single-agent search.

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VL - 59

SP - 352

EP - 369

JO - Journal of Monetary Economics

JF - Journal of Monetary Economics

IS - 4

ER -

Joint-search theory: New opportunities and new frictions

Abstract

All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes

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