TY - JOUR
T1 - Islam, militancy, and politics in Pakistan
T2 - Insights from a national sample
AU - Christine Fair, C.
AU - Malhotra, Neil
AU - Shapiro, Jacob N.
N1 - Funding Information:
11. CIA World Factbook-Pakistan, updated bi-weekly, no date. https://www.cia.gov/ library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/pk.html 12. Fair oversaw this effort with funding from the United States Institute of Peace in consultation with PIPA, Shapiro, and others. See C. Christine Fair, Clay Ramsay, and Steve Kull, Pakistani Public Opinion on Democracy, Islamist Militancy, and Relations with the U.S., USIP/PIPA Working Paper, January 2008. Available at http://www.usip.org/ resources/pakistani-public-opinion-democracy-islamist-militancy-and-relations-us 13. See Worldpublicopinon.com, ‘‘Pakistani Public Opinion on the Swat Conflict, Afghanistan, and the US,’’ July 1, 2009. http://www.worldpublicopinion.org/pipa/pdf/ jul09/WPO_Pakistan_Jul09_quaire.pdf 14. See Pew Global Attitudes Survey, Pakistani Public Opinion: Growing Concerns About Extremism, Continuing Discontent With U.S., August 2009. http://pewglobal.org/ reports/pdf/265.pdf 15. See for example, C. Christine Fair, ‘‘Who are Pakistan’s Militants and Their Families?’’, Terrorism and Political Violence 21, no. 1 (January 2008); Fair et al., Pakistani Public Opinion on Democracy, Islamist Militancy, and Relations with the U.S. (see note 12 above). Fair also helped PIPA with questionnaire items on the 2009 survey of Pakistanis as well as the 2008 survey conducted by PIPA in association with the National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START). See PIPA/START, Public Opinion in the Islamic World on Terrorism, al Qaeda, and US Policies, February 2009. Available at http:// www.worldpublicopinion.org/pipa/pdf/feb09/STARTII_Feb09_quaire.pdf 16. United Nations Development Program, Human Development Report 2007 Data, http://hdrstats.undp.org/buildtables/# 17. Population Council, Adolescents and Youth in Pakistan 2001–02: A Nationally Representative Survey (New York, Islamabad: Population Council, July 2003). www.popcouncil. net/projects/TA_PakNationalSurvey.html 18. Balochistan, for example, is the largest province geographically accounting for 44 percent of Pakistan’s entire landmass of 796,096 sq. km. yet, it accounts for a mere five percent of Pakistan’s population. Combined with this small population Balochistan is also one of the most ethnically and economically diverse provinces in Pakistan. While Baloch are the largest ethnic group, there are substantial populations of Pashtuns, Brahvis, Sindhis, Punjabis, Saraikhis, Makranis (of African descent), and numerous ethnic minorities including Sikhs, Hindus, and Parsees. Many of these groups are geographically clustered resulting in a ‘‘clumpy’’ distribution of groups.
PY - 2010
Y1 - 2010
N2 - We use data from an innovative nationally representative survey of 6,000 Pakistanis in April 2009 to study beliefs about political Islam, Sharia, the legitimacy and efficacy of jihad, and attitudes towards specific militant organizations. These issues are at the forefront of U.S. policy towards Pakistan. Four results shed new light on the politics of militancy and Islamic identity in Pakistan. First, there is no relationship between measures of personal religiosity and the likelihood a respondent expresses highly sectarian sentiments. Second, militarized jihad is widely seen as legitimate in Pakistan but there are substantial regional differences in the acceptance of militarized jihad. Third, attitudes towards militant groups vary dramatically across groups, particularly when it comes to the efficacy of their actions. Fourth, while Pakistanis express massive levels of support for Sharia law, this is driven by its perceived connection with good governance, not by sympathy with the goals of militant groups claiming to implement it.
AB - We use data from an innovative nationally representative survey of 6,000 Pakistanis in April 2009 to study beliefs about political Islam, Sharia, the legitimacy and efficacy of jihad, and attitudes towards specific militant organizations. These issues are at the forefront of U.S. policy towards Pakistan. Four results shed new light on the politics of militancy and Islamic identity in Pakistan. First, there is no relationship between measures of personal religiosity and the likelihood a respondent expresses highly sectarian sentiments. Second, militarized jihad is widely seen as legitimate in Pakistan but there are substantial regional differences in the acceptance of militarized jihad. Third, attitudes towards militant groups vary dramatically across groups, particularly when it comes to the efficacy of their actions. Fourth, while Pakistanis express massive levels of support for Sharia law, this is driven by its perceived connection with good governance, not by sympathy with the goals of militant groups claiming to implement it.
KW - Militancy in Pakistan
KW - Pakistani religious identity
KW - Politics of militancy
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=77956497371&partnerID=8YFLogxK
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/citedby.url?scp=77956497371&partnerID=8YFLogxK
U2 - 10.1080/09546553.2010.492305
DO - 10.1080/09546553.2010.492305
M3 - Article
AN - SCOPUS:77956497371
SN - 0954-6553
VL - 22
SP - 495
EP - 521
JO - Terrorism and Political Violence
JF - Terrorism and Political Violence
IS - 4
ER -