Instrumental desires, instrumental rationality: I - Michael Smith

Michael Smith, Edward Harcourt

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

24 Scopus citations

Abstract

The requirements of instrumental rationality are often thought to be normative conditions on choice or intention, but this is a mistake. Instrumental rationality is best understood as a requirement of coherence on an agent's non-instrumental desires and means-end beliefs. Since only a subset of an agent's means-end beliefs concern possible actions, the connection with intention is thus more oblique. This requirement of coherence can be satisfied either locally or more globally, it may be only one among a number of such requirements on an agent's total set of desires and beliefs, and it has no special connection with reasoning. An appreciation of these facts leads to a better understanding of both the nature and the significance of instrumental rationality.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)93-109
Number of pages17
JournalProceedings of the Aristotelean Society
Volume78
Issue number1
DOIs
StatePublished - 2004

All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes

  • Philosophy

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