TY - JOUR
T1 - Information design
T2 - A unified perspective
AU - Bergemann, Dirk
AU - Morris, Stephen
N1 - Funding Information:
*Bergemann: Department of Economics, Yale University. Morris: Department of Economics, Princeton University. We acknowledge financial support from NSF Grants SES 0851200 and 1459899. We are grateful for productive suggestions by the Editor, Steven Durlauf, and five anonymous referees. This material has been presented in lectures at the 2015 Istanbul meetings of the Society of Economic Design, the 2015 Delhi School of Economics Winter School, the 2016 AEA meetings, the North American Summer Meeting of the Econometric Society, the Gerzensee Summer Symposium in Economic Theory, the Becker Friedman Institute conference on Frontiers and Economic Theory and Computer Science, the Harris
PY - 2019/3
Y1 - 2019/3
N2 - Given a game with uncertain payoffs, information design analyzes the extent to which the provision of information alone can influence the behavior of the players. Information design has a literal interpretation, under which there is a real information designer who can commit to the choice of the best information structure (from her perspective) for a set of participants in a game. We emphasize a metaphorical interpretation, under which the information design problem is used by the analyst to characterize play in the game under many different information structures. We provide an introduction to the basic issues and insights of a rapidly growing literature in information design. We show how the literal and metaphorical interpretations of information design unify a large body of existing work, including that on communication in games (Myerson 1991), Bayesian persuasion (Kamenica and Gentzkow 2011), and some of our own recent work on robust predictions in games of incomplete information.
AB - Given a game with uncertain payoffs, information design analyzes the extent to which the provision of information alone can influence the behavior of the players. Information design has a literal interpretation, under which there is a real information designer who can commit to the choice of the best information structure (from her perspective) for a set of participants in a game. We emphasize a metaphorical interpretation, under which the information design problem is used by the analyst to characterize play in the game under many different information structures. We provide an introduction to the basic issues and insights of a rapidly growing literature in information design. We show how the literal and metaphorical interpretations of information design unify a large body of existing work, including that on communication in games (Myerson 1991), Bayesian persuasion (Kamenica and Gentzkow 2011), and some of our own recent work on robust predictions in games of incomplete information.
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U2 - 10.1257/jel.20181489
DO - 10.1257/jel.20181489
M3 - Article
AN - SCOPUS:85066009529
VL - 57
SP - 44
EP - 95
JO - Journal of Economic Literature
JF - Journal of Economic Literature
SN - 0022-0515
IS - 1
ER -