TY - JOUR
T1 - Inferences about members of kinds
T2 - The generics hypothesis
AU - Khemlani, Sangeet
AU - Leslie, Sarah Jane
AU - Glucksberg, Sam
N1 - Funding Information:
Correspondence should be addressed to Sangeet Khemlani, Department of Psychology, Princeton University, 3-C-6 Green Hall, Princeton, NJ 08540, USA. E-mail: [email protected] This work was supported in part by a National Science Foundation Graduate Research Fellowship awarded to Sangeet Khemlani. We thank Jeremy Boyd, Adele Goldberg, Phil Johnson-Laird, Mark Johnston, Olivia Kang, Niklas Kunze, Max Lotstein, Adam Moore, and Lance Rips for their many helpful discussions and suggestions.
PY - 2012/7
Y1 - 2012/7
N2 - People routinely make inferences based on kind membership. For example, if you were told that a particular kind of animal is a tiger, then you would likely infer that it has stripes. Under what conditions are people willing to infer that a member of a given kind has a property? Two hypotheses were examined. The base rate or prevalence hypothesis holds that people rely only on their knowledge of the statistical frequency of a property among its kind to infer whether a member has that property. An alternative is the generics hypothesis, which states that people are influenced by their belief that the relevant generic generalization is true. In other words, if people agree to the generalization, "ducks lay eggs", then they should be willing to make the inference that an arbitrary individual duck lays eggs, despite their knowledge that the majority of ducks do not lay eggs (i.e., juveniles, males, and infertile females). We present data that support the second hypothesis. Rather than being driven solely by beliefs about prevalence, agreement to the relevant generic predicted performance on an inference task beyond estimated prevalence or cue validity. These findings suggest that models of categorization that are based solely on statistical or simple probabilistic principles are incomplete. They also provide support for the idea that generics articulate core conceptual beliefs that guide our interactions with the world.
AB - People routinely make inferences based on kind membership. For example, if you were told that a particular kind of animal is a tiger, then you would likely infer that it has stripes. Under what conditions are people willing to infer that a member of a given kind has a property? Two hypotheses were examined. The base rate or prevalence hypothesis holds that people rely only on their knowledge of the statistical frequency of a property among its kind to infer whether a member has that property. An alternative is the generics hypothesis, which states that people are influenced by their belief that the relevant generic generalization is true. In other words, if people agree to the generalization, "ducks lay eggs", then they should be willing to make the inference that an arbitrary individual duck lays eggs, despite their knowledge that the majority of ducks do not lay eggs (i.e., juveniles, males, and infertile females). We present data that support the second hypothesis. Rather than being driven solely by beliefs about prevalence, agreement to the relevant generic predicted performance on an inference task beyond estimated prevalence or cue validity. These findings suggest that models of categorization that are based solely on statistical or simple probabilistic principles are incomplete. They also provide support for the idea that generics articulate core conceptual beliefs that guide our interactions with the world.
KW - Concepts
KW - Default inferences
KW - Generics
KW - Generics hypothesis
KW - Non-monotonic reasoning
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U2 - 10.1080/01690965.2011.601900
DO - 10.1080/01690965.2011.601900
M3 - Article
AN - SCOPUS:84863508954
SN - 0169-0965
VL - 27
SP - 887
EP - 900
JO - Language and Cognitive Processes
JF - Language and Cognitive Processes
IS - 6
ER -