In Defense of Bias: Replies to Berker, Greco, and Johnson

This is a contribution to a book symposium on Bias: A Philosophical Study, in which I respond to commentaries by Gabbrielle Johnson, Daniel Greco, and Selim Berker. In response to Johnson, I argue that many paradigmatic cases of bias are not best understood as involving underdetermination, and I defend my alternative account of bias against the concerns that she raises. In response to Greco, I note some of the ways in which the credibility of my claims depends on further empirical research, and I clarify my claims about introspection in order to show that they are consistent with the possibilities that he raises. In response to Berker, I offer a view about the metaphysical status of “non-pejorative” biases while resisting his suggestion that all non-evaluative uses of the term “bias” are misuses of the term. I defend my proposal that our knowledge that skeptical hypotheses are false is a case of “biased knowing” against a dilemma that he raises for that possibility.