TY - JOUR
T1 - IMF program compliance
T2 - Aggregate index versus policy specific research strategies
AU - Vreeland, James R.
N1 - Funding Information:
2 Another possibility outside of this stark presentation device is that (1) countries fail to comply, (2) IMF loans subsidize bad policies, (3) and the IMF also imposes bad policies of its own. This possibility is supported by evidence of Dreher_s (2006) study discussed below. I owe this suggestion to Mark Choi.
PY - 2006/12
Y1 - 2006/12
N2 - Consensus has grown that the economic reform programs of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) have failed to promote economic development. There is little consensus about how IMF programs should be reformed, however, because we do not understand why IMF programs have failed. Some critics contend that the IMF's austere policy conditions are inappropriate for most program-countries and cause economic crises to deepen. Other critics argue that the policy conditions are actually ignored, and the IMF program loan ends up subsidizing the bad policies that caused the economic crises in the first place. This debate begs the compliance question. Unfortunately, the study of IMF compliance is not straightforward. IMF agreements span many dimensions, and the dimensions vary from agreement to agreement. Even along one dimension, governments are not held to the same standard. Rather than look at aggregate measures of compliance, this article proposes a return to studying specific conditions as was done in the earliest studies on IMF compliance.
AB - Consensus has grown that the economic reform programs of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) have failed to promote economic development. There is little consensus about how IMF programs should be reformed, however, because we do not understand why IMF programs have failed. Some critics contend that the IMF's austere policy conditions are inappropriate for most program-countries and cause economic crises to deepen. Other critics argue that the policy conditions are actually ignored, and the IMF program loan ends up subsidizing the bad policies that caused the economic crises in the first place. This debate begs the compliance question. Unfortunately, the study of IMF compliance is not straightforward. IMF agreements span many dimensions, and the dimensions vary from agreement to agreement. Even along one dimension, governments are not held to the same standard. Rather than look at aggregate measures of compliance, this article proposes a return to studying specific conditions as was done in the earliest studies on IMF compliance.
KW - Compliance
KW - Development
KW - IMF programs
KW - Program evaluation
KW - Selection
UR - https://www.scopus.com/pages/publications/33750802985
UR - https://www.scopus.com/pages/publications/33750802985#tab=citedBy
U2 - 10.1007/s11558-006-0161-6
DO - 10.1007/s11558-006-0161-6
M3 - Article
AN - SCOPUS:33750802985
SN - 1559-7431
VL - 1
SP - 359
EP - 378
JO - Review of International Organizations
JF - Review of International Organizations
IS - 4
ER -