If You Can't Change What You Believe, You Don't Believe It

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14 Scopus citations

Abstract

I develop and defend the view that subjects are necessarily psychologically able to revise their beliefs in response to relevant counter-evidence. Specifically, subjects can revise their beliefs in response to relevant counter-evidence, given their current psychological mechanisms and skills. If a subject lacks this ability, then the mental state in question is not a belief, though it may be some other kind of cognitive attitude, such as a supposition, an entertained thought, or a pretense. The result is a moderately revisionary view of belief: while most mental states we thought were beliefs are beliefs, some mental states which we thought were beliefs are not beliefs. The argument for this view draws on two key claims: First, subjects are rationally obligated to revise their beliefs in response to relevant counter-evidence. Second, if some subject is rationally obligated to revise one of her mental states, then that subject can revise that mental state, given her current psychological mechanisms and skills. Along the way to defending these claims, I argue that rational obligations can govern activities which reflect on one's rational character, whether or not those activities are under one's voluntary control. I also show how the relevant version of epistemic ‘ought’ implies ‘can’ survives an objection which plagues other variants of the principle.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)501-526
Number of pages26
JournalNous
Volume54
Issue number3
DOIs
StatePublished - Sep 1 2020

All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes

  • Philosophy

Keywords

  • delusion
  • doxastic obligation
  • doxastic voluntarism
  • epistemic normativity
  • implicit bias
  • nature of belief
  • norms of rationality
  • rational character
  • ‘ought’ implies ‘can’

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