TY - JOUR
T1 - Ideology, tactics, and efficiency in redistributive politics
AU - Dixit, Avinash
AU - Londregan, John
N1 - Funding Information:
* We thank the National Science Foundation for financial support, and Austan Goolsbee, Gene Grossman, Jack Hirshleifer, Susanne Lohmann, Torsten Persson, participants in several seminars, and the referees and editors, for useful comments and suggestions.
PY - 1998/5
Y1 - 1998/5
N2 - We model the electoral politics of redistribution when voters and parties care about inequality in addition to their private concerns for consumption and votes, respectively. Ideological concerns about income redistribution lead each party to adopt a general proportional income tax, adjusted to appeal to the ideological leanings of high "clout" groups, with disproportionately many "swing" voters, which the parties also ply with pork-barrel projects. Our results relate to "Director's Law," which says that redistributive politics favors middle classes at the expense of both rich and poor.
AB - We model the electoral politics of redistribution when voters and parties care about inequality in addition to their private concerns for consumption and votes, respectively. Ideological concerns about income redistribution lead each party to adopt a general proportional income tax, adjusted to appeal to the ideological leanings of high "clout" groups, with disproportionately many "swing" voters, which the parties also ply with pork-barrel projects. Our results relate to "Director's Law," which says that redistributive politics favors middle classes at the expense of both rich and poor.
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U2 - 10.1162/003355398555667
DO - 10.1162/003355398555667
M3 - Article
AN - SCOPUS:0040944385
SN - 0033-5533
VL - 113
SP - 497
EP - 529
JO - Quarterly Journal of Economics
JF - Quarterly Journal of Economics
IS - 2
ER -