@inproceedings{b1c74fd59fc546a98864d8af9f81d72b,
title = "How to generate and use universal samplers",
abstract = "A random oracle is an idealization that allows us to model a hash function as an oracle that will output a uniformly random string given any input. We introduce the notion of a universal sampler scheme that extends the notion of a random oracle, to a method of sampling securely from arbitrary distributions. We describe several applications that provide a natural motivation for this notion; these include generating the trusted parameters for many schemes from just a single trusted setup. We further demonstrate the versatility of universal samplers by showing how they give rise to simple constructions of identity-based encryption and multiparty key exchange. In particular, we construct adaptively secure non-interactive multiparty key exchange in the random oracle model based on indistinguishability obfuscation; obtaining the first known construction of adaptively secure NIKE without complexity leveraging. We give a solution that shows how to transform any random oracle into a universal sampler scheme, based on indistinguishability obfuscation. At the heart of our construction and proof is a new technique we call “delayed backdoor programming” that we believe will have other applications.",
author = "Dennis Hofheinz and Tibor Jager and Dakshita Khurana and Amit Sahai and Brent Waters and Mark Zhandry",
note = "Funding Information: D. Hofheinz-Supported by DFG grants GZ HO 4534/2-1 and GZ HO 4534/4-1. D. Khurana and A. Sahai-Research supported in part from a DARPA/ARL SAFEWARE award, NSF Frontier Award 1413955, NSF grants 1228984, 1136174, and 1065276, a Xerox Faculty Research Award, a Google Faculty Research Award, an equipment grant from Intel, and an Okawa Foundation Research Grant. This material is based upon work supported by the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency through the ARL under Contract W911NF-15-C-0205. The views expressed are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or position of the Department of Defense, the National Science Foundation, or the U.S. Government. B. Waters-Supported by NSF CNS-0915361 and CNS-0952692, CNS-1228599 DARPA through the U.S. Office of Naval Research under Contract N00014-11-1-0382, DARPA SAFEWARE Award, Google Faculty Research award, the Alfred P. Sloan Fellowship, Microsoft Faculty Fellowship, and Packard Foundation Fellowship. M. Zhandry-Work done while a graduate student at Stanford University supported by the DARPA PROCEED program. Any opinions, findings and conclusions or recommendations expressed in this material are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of DARPA. Publisher Copyright: {\textcopyright} International Association for Cryptologic Research 2016.; 22nd International Conference on the Theory and Application of Cryptology and Information Security, ASIACRYPT 2016 ; Conference date: 04-12-2016 Through 08-12-2016",
year = "2016",
doi = "10.1007/978-3-662-53890-6_24",
language = "English (US)",
isbn = "9783662538890",
series = "Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics)",
publisher = "Springer Verlag",
pages = "715--744",
editor = "Cheon, {Jung Hee} and Tsuyoshi Takagi",
booktitle = "Advances in Cryptology - ASIACRYPT 2016 - 22nd International Conference on the Theory and Application of Cryptology and Information Security, Proceedings",
address = "Germany",
}