TY - GEN
T1 - How Can Memory-Augmented Neural Networks Pass a False-Belief Task?
AU - Grant, Erin
AU - Nematzadeh, Aida
AU - Griffiths, Thomas L.
N1 - Publisher Copyright:
© CogSci 2017.
PY - 2017
Y1 - 2017
N2 - A question-answering system needs to be able to reason about unobserved causes in order to answer questions of the sort that people face in everyday conversations. Recent neural network models that incorporate explicit memory and attention mechanisms have taken steps towards this capability. However, these models have not been tested in scenarios for which reasoning about the unobservable mental states of other agents is necessary to answer a question. We propose a new set of tasks inspired by the well-known false-belief test to examine how a recent question-answering model performs in situations that require reasoning about latent mental states. We find that the model is only successful when the training and test data bear substantial similarity, as it memorizes how to answer specific questions and cannot reason about the causal relationship between actions and latent mental states. We introduce an extension to the model that explicitly simulates the mental representations of different participants in a reasoning task, and show that this capacity increases the model's performance on our theory of mind test.
AB - A question-answering system needs to be able to reason about unobserved causes in order to answer questions of the sort that people face in everyday conversations. Recent neural network models that incorporate explicit memory and attention mechanisms have taken steps towards this capability. However, these models have not been tested in scenarios for which reasoning about the unobservable mental states of other agents is necessary to answer a question. We propose a new set of tasks inspired by the well-known false-belief test to examine how a recent question-answering model performs in situations that require reasoning about latent mental states. We find that the model is only successful when the training and test data bear substantial similarity, as it memorizes how to answer specific questions and cannot reason about the causal relationship between actions and latent mental states. We introduce an extension to the model that explicitly simulates the mental representations of different participants in a reasoning task, and show that this capacity increases the model's performance on our theory of mind test.
KW - false-belief test
KW - language understanding
KW - question answering
KW - theory of mind
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=85081728140&partnerID=8YFLogxK
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/citedby.url?scp=85081728140&partnerID=8YFLogxK
M3 - Conference contribution
AN - SCOPUS:85081728140
T3 - CogSci 2017 - Proceedings of the 39th Annual Meeting of the Cognitive Science Society: Computational Foundations of Cognition
SP - 427
EP - 432
BT - CogSci 2017 - Proceedings of the 39th Annual Meeting of the Cognitive Science Society
PB - The Cognitive Science Society
T2 - 39th Annual Meeting of the Cognitive Science Society: Computational Foundations of Cognition, CogSci 2017
Y2 - 26 July 2017 through 29 July 2017
ER -