Internet censorship and surveillance have made anonymity tools increasingly critical for free and open Internet access. Tor, and its associated ecosystem of volunteer traffic relays, provides one of the most secure and widely-available means for achieving Internet anonymity today. Unfortunately, Tor has limitations, including poor performance, inadequate capacity, and a susceptibility to wholesale blocking. Rather than utilizing a large number of volunteers (as Tor does), we propose moving onion-routing services to the “cloud” to leverage the large capacities, robust connectivity, and economies of scale inherent to commercial datacenters. This paper describes Cloud-based Onion Routing (COR), which builds onion-routed tunnels over multiple anonymity service providers and through multiple cloud hosting providers, dividing trust while forcing censors to incur large collateral damage. We discuss the new security policies and mechanisms needed for such a provider-based ecosystem, and present some preliminary benchmarks. At today’s prices, a user could gain fast, anonymous network access through COR for only pennies per day.
|Published - Jan 1 2011
|1st USENIX Workshop on Free and Open Communications on the Internet, FOCI 2011, co-located with USENIX Security 2011 - San Francisco, United States
Duration: Aug 8 2011 → …
|1st USENIX Workshop on Free and Open Communications on the Internet, FOCI 2011, co-located with USENIX Security 2011
|8/8/11 → …
All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes
- Computer Networks and Communications