Abstract
Distributing subsidized health products through existing health infrastructure could substantially and cost-effectively improve health in sub-Saharan Africa. There is, however, widespread concern that poor governance – in particular, limited health worker accountability – seriously undermines the effectiveness of subsidy programs. We audit targeted bed net distribution programs to quantify the extent of agency problems. We find that around 80% of the eligible receive the subsidy as intended, and up to 15% of subsidies are leaked to ineligible people. Supplementing the program with simple financial or monitoring incentives for health workers does not improve performance further and is thus not cost-effective in this context.
Original language | English (US) |
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Pages (from-to) | 150-169 |
Number of pages | 20 |
Journal | Journal of Public Economics |
Volume | 156 |
DOIs | |
State | Published - Dec 2017 |
Externally published | Yes |
All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes
- Finance
- Economics and Econometrics
Keywords
- Extortion
- Leakage
- Motivation
- Shirking