Global horse trading: IMF loans for votes in the United Nations Security Council

Axel Dreher; Jan Egbert Sturm; James Raymond Vreeland

doi:10.1016/j.euroecorev.2009.03.002

Global horse trading: IMF loans for votes in the United Nations Security Council

Axel Dreher, Jan Egbert Sturm, James Raymond Vreeland

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › peer-review

252 Scopus citations

Abstract

We investigate whether temporary members of the United Nations Security Council receive favorable treatment from the International Monetary Fund (IMF) using panel data for 197 countries over the period from 1951 to 2004. Our results indicate a robust positive relationship between temporary Security Council membership and participation in IMF programs, even after accounting for economic, political, and country-specific factors. There is also evidence that Security Council membership reduces the number of conditions included in IMF programs. IMF loans seem to be a mechanism by which the major shareholders of the Fund can win favor with voting members of the Security Council.

Original language	English (US)
Pages (from-to)	742-757
Number of pages	16
Journal	European Economic Review
Volume	53
Issue number	7
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1016/j.euroecorev.2009.03.002
State	Published - Oct 2009
Externally published	Yes

All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes

Finance
Economics and Econometrics

Keywords

Aid
IMF
United Nations Security Council
Voting

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10.1016/j.euroecorev.2009.03.002

Cite this

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abstract = "We investigate whether temporary members of the United Nations Security Council receive favorable treatment from the International Monetary Fund (IMF) using panel data for 197 countries over the period from 1951 to 2004. Our results indicate a robust positive relationship between temporary Security Council membership and participation in IMF programs, even after accounting for economic, political, and country-specific factors. There is also evidence that Security Council membership reduces the number of conditions included in IMF programs. IMF loans seem to be a mechanism by which the major shareholders of the Fund can win favor with voting members of the Security Council.",

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AB - We investigate whether temporary members of the United Nations Security Council receive favorable treatment from the International Monetary Fund (IMF) using panel data for 197 countries over the period from 1951 to 2004. Our results indicate a robust positive relationship between temporary Security Council membership and participation in IMF programs, even after accounting for economic, political, and country-specific factors. There is also evidence that Security Council membership reduces the number of conditions included in IMF programs. IMF loans seem to be a mechanism by which the major shareholders of the Fund can win favor with voting members of the Security Council.

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Global horse trading: IMF loans for votes in the United Nations Security Council

Abstract

All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes

Keywords

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