Global horse trading: IMF loans for votes in the United Nations Security Council

Axel Dreher, Jan Egbert Sturm, James Raymond Vreeland

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

174 Scopus citations


We investigate whether temporary members of the United Nations Security Council receive favorable treatment from the International Monetary Fund (IMF) using panel data for 197 countries over the period from 1951 to 2004. Our results indicate a robust positive relationship between temporary Security Council membership and participation in IMF programs, even after accounting for economic, political, and country-specific factors. There is also evidence that Security Council membership reduces the number of conditions included in IMF programs. IMF loans seem to be a mechanism by which the major shareholders of the Fund can win favor with voting members of the Security Council.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)742-757
Number of pages16
JournalEuropean Economic Review
Issue number7
StatePublished - Oct 1 2009
Externally publishedYes

All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes

  • Finance
  • Economics and Econometrics


  • Aid
  • IMF
  • United Nations Security Council
  • Voting

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