Generalized median voter schemes and committees

Salvador Barberà, Faruk R. Gul, Ennio Stacchetti

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

136 Scopus citations

Abstract

We define a multidimensional analogue of a single-peaked preference and generalize the notion of a median voter scheme. Every onto strategy-proof social choice function on a single-peaked domain is a generalized median voter scheme. Since a single-peaked preference can be identified unequivocally with its bliss point, one can view a social choice function as an Arrowian social welfare function. We show that a social choice function is strategy-proof iff, viewed as a social welfare function, it satisfies a monotonicity property. Finally, we investigate strategic decision making in hierarchical committees. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: C72, D71.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)262-289
Number of pages28
JournalJournal of Economic Theory
Volume61
Issue number2
DOIs
StatePublished - Jan 1 1993
Externally publishedYes

All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes

  • Economics and Econometrics

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