TY - GEN
T1 - Game theory based peer grading mechanisms for MOOCs
AU - Wu, William
AU - Tzamos, Christos
AU - Daskalakis, Constantinos
AU - Weinberg, Matthew
AU - Kaashoek, Nicolaas
N1 - Publisher Copyright:
Copyright © 2015 ACM.
PY - 2015/3/14
Y1 - 2015/3/14
N2 - An efficient peer grading mechanism is proposed for grading the multitude of assignments in online courses. This novel approach is based on game theory and mechanism design. A set of assumptions and a mathematical model is ratified to simulate the dominant strategy behavior of students in a given mechanism. A benchmark function accounting for grade accuracy and workload is established to quantitatively compare effectiveness and scalability of various mechanisms. After multiple iterations of mechanisms under increasingly realistic assumptions, three are proposed: Calibration, Improved Calibration, and Deduction. The Calibration mechanism performs as predicted by game theory when tested in an online crowd-sourced experiment, but fails when students are assumed to communicate. The Improved Calibration mechanism addresses this assumption, but at the cost of more effort spent grading. The Deduction mechanism performs relatively well in the benchmark, outperforming the Calibration, Improved Calibration, traditional automated, and traditional peer grading systems. The mathematical model and benchmark opens the way for future derivative works to be performed and compared.
AB - An efficient peer grading mechanism is proposed for grading the multitude of assignments in online courses. This novel approach is based on game theory and mechanism design. A set of assumptions and a mathematical model is ratified to simulate the dominant strategy behavior of students in a given mechanism. A benchmark function accounting for grade accuracy and workload is established to quantitatively compare effectiveness and scalability of various mechanisms. After multiple iterations of mechanisms under increasingly realistic assumptions, three are proposed: Calibration, Improved Calibration, and Deduction. The Calibration mechanism performs as predicted by game theory when tested in an online crowd-sourced experiment, but fails when students are assumed to communicate. The Improved Calibration mechanism addresses this assumption, but at the cost of more effort spent grading. The Deduction mechanism performs relatively well in the benchmark, outperforming the Calibration, Improved Calibration, traditional automated, and traditional peer grading systems. The mathematical model and benchmark opens the way for future derivative works to be performed and compared.
KW - Game theory
KW - Learning at scale
KW - MOOC
KW - Massive open online courses
KW - Mechanism design
KW - Peer grading
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=84928003860&partnerID=8YFLogxK
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/citedby.url?scp=84928003860&partnerID=8YFLogxK
U2 - 10.1145/2724660.2728676
DO - 10.1145/2724660.2728676
M3 - Conference contribution
AN - SCOPUS:84928003860
T3 - L@S 2015 - 2nd ACM Conference on Learning at Scale
SP - 281
EP - 286
BT - L@S 2015 - 2nd ACM Conference on Learning at Scale
PB - Association for Computing Machinery
T2 - 2nd ACM Conference on Learning at Scale, L@S 2015
Y2 - 14 March 2015 through 18 March 2015
ER -