As a strategy for exploring the relationship between understanding and knowledge, we consider whether epistemic luck - which is typically thought to undermine knowledge - undermines understanding. Questions about the etiology of understanding have also been at the heart of recent theoretical debates within epistemology. Kvanvig (2003) put forward the argument that there could be lucky understanding and produced an example that he deemed persuasive. Grimm (2006) responded with a case that, he argued, demonstrated that there could not be lucky understanding. In this paper, we empirically examine how participants' patterns of understanding attributions line up with the predictions of Kvanvig and Grimm. We argue that the data challenge Kvanvig's position. People do not differentiate between knowing-why and understanding-why on the basis of proper etiology: attributions of knowledge and understanding involve comparable (and minimal) roles for epistemic luck. We thus posit that folk knowledge and understanding are etiologically symmetrical.
|Original language||English (US)|
|Number of pages||26|
|State||Published - Mar 1 2018|
All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes
- History and Philosophy of Science