Financial crises and central bank independence

Alan S. Blinder

doi:10.1057/be.2013.12

Financial crises and central bank independence

Alan S. Blinder

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › peer-review

9 Scopus citations

Abstract

Although cooperation between central banks and treasuries is controversial, this paper contends that in a crisis it is inevitable and desirable. Six reasons for cooperation in a crisis are advanced. Disengagement in the aftermath and restoring central bank independence is tricky, however. The paper concludes with comments on what is necessary to maintain central bank credibility.

Original language	English (US)
Pages (from-to)	163-165
Number of pages	3
Journal	Business Economics
Volume	48
Issue number	3
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1057/be.2013.12
State	Published - Jul 2013
Externally published	Yes

All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes

Business and International Management
Economics and Econometrics

Keywords

central bank independence
credibility
financial crisis
monetary policy
postcrisis aftermath
treasury cooperation

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10.1057/be.2013.12

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title = "Financial crises and central bank independence",

abstract = "Although cooperation between central banks and treasuries is controversial, this paper contends that in a crisis it is inevitable and desirable. Six reasons for cooperation in a crisis are advanced. Disengagement in the aftermath and restoring central bank independence is tricky, however. The paper concludes with comments on what is necessary to maintain central bank credibility.",

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AB - Although cooperation between central banks and treasuries is controversial, this paper contends that in a crisis it is inevitable and desirable. Six reasons for cooperation in a crisis are advanced. Disengagement in the aftermath and restoring central bank independence is tricky, however. The paper concludes with comments on what is necessary to maintain central bank credibility.

KW - central bank independence

KW - credibility

KW - financial crisis

KW - monetary policy

KW - postcrisis aftermath

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JO - Business Economics

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IS - 3

ER -

Financial crises and central bank independence

Abstract

All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes

Keywords

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