Abstract
Although cooperation between central banks and treasuries is controversial, this paper contends that in a crisis it is inevitable and desirable. Six reasons for cooperation in a crisis are advanced. Disengagement in the aftermath and restoring central bank independence is tricky, however. The paper concludes with comments on what is necessary to maintain central bank credibility.
Original language | English (US) |
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Pages (from-to) | 163-165 |
Number of pages | 3 |
Journal | Business Economics |
Volume | 48 |
Issue number | 3 |
DOIs | |
State | Published - Jul 2013 |
Externally published | Yes |
All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes
- Business and International Management
- Economics and Econometrics
Keywords
- central bank independence
- credibility
- financial crisis
- monetary policy
- postcrisis aftermath
- treasury cooperation