Financial crises and central bank independence

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

4 Scopus citations


Although cooperation between central banks and treasuries is controversial, this paper contends that in a crisis it is inevitable and desirable. Six reasons for cooperation in a crisis are advanced. Disengagement in the aftermath and restoring central bank independence is tricky, however. The paper concludes with comments on what is necessary to maintain central bank credibility.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)163-165
Number of pages3
JournalBusiness Economics
Issue number3
StatePublished - Jul 1 2013
Externally publishedYes

All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes

  • Business and International Management
  • Economics and Econometrics


  • central bank independence
  • credibility
  • financial crisis
  • monetary policy
  • postcrisis aftermath
  • treasury cooperation

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