Abstract
In this chapter, it will be argued that a fictionalist account, in one central sense of that ambiguous phrase, of an area of discourse is not something that can be called correct or incorrect once and for all. Rather, areas of discourse often evolve from phases for which an error theory is most appropriate to phases for which a fictionalist account is appropriate. They can then evolve further into phases for which a straightforward account is appropriate. The latter can occur when the meaning of a key term changes. The phenomenon will be illustrated by examples from several areas of discourse.
| Original language | English (US) |
|---|---|
| Title of host publication | Fictionalism in Philosophy |
| Publisher | Oxford University Press |
| Pages | 48-60 |
| Number of pages | 13 |
| ISBN (Electronic) | 9780190689636 |
| ISBN (Print) | 9780190689605 |
| DOIs | |
| State | Published - Jan 1 2020 |
All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes
- General Mathematics
- General Arts and Humanities
- General Social Sciences
Keywords
- Content
- Feigned belief
- Fiction
- Force
- Nonfiction
- Sincere belief