Abstract
It is generally held that a leader’s optimism about the likely outcome of a war can be a cause of war. When two rivals disagree about what they can expect to win by force, both might prefer to fight rather than settle a dispute. This explanation is usually referred to as war resulting from “mutual optimism.” Conventionally, the literature suggests that the more extreme this mutual optimism grows—the wider the gap between leaders’ assessments—the more likely conflict is. We show that there is no necessary, logical reason to believe that divergent beliefs tend to make conflict more likely. In a dynamic bargaining model, we find that increasing leaders’ mutual optimism can prevent war. In fact, conflict can be more likely between actors with similar underlying beliefs than between actors whose beliefs are radically different. We call this “fanatical peace.”
| Original language | English (US) |
|---|---|
| Pages (from-to) | 1094-1107 |
| Number of pages | 14 |
| Journal | Journal of Politics |
| Volume | 87 |
| Issue number | 3 |
| DOIs | |
| State | Published - Jul 2025 |
All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes
- Sociology and Political Science
Keywords
- common priors
- crisis bargaining
- mutual optimism
- war