@article{7ebdaac16a0345a09689aa16e1af7f6e,
title = "Faith and rational deference to authority",
abstract = "Many accounts of faith hold that faith is deference to an authority about what to believe or what to do. I show that this kind of faith fits into a more general account of faith, the risky-commitment account. I further argue that it can be rational to defer to an authority even when the authority's pronouncement goes against one's own reasoning. Indeed, such deference is rational in typical cases in which individuals treat others as authorities.",
keywords = "decision theory, epistemology, ethics, faith, philosophy of religion, testimony",
author = "Lara Buchak",
note = "Funding Information: This paper benefited greatly from comments by Dan Speak, Stephen Grimm, Chris Tweedt, Joshua Mugg, and Jonathan Rutledge; and from discussions at Rutgers University, the University of Massachusetts at Amherst, Indiana University, and Brooklyn College. This paper was also made possible through the support of a grant from the John Templeton Foundation (the opinions expressed in this publication are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the John Templeton Foundation). Publisher Copyright: {\textcopyright} 2023 The Authors. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research published by Wiley Periodicals LLC on behalf of Philosophy and Phenonmenological Research Inc.",
year = "2023",
doi = "10.1111/phpr.12996",
language = "English (US)",
journal = "Philosophy and Phenomenological Research",
issn = "0031-8205",
publisher = "Wiley-Blackwell",
}