Fair social orderings

M. Fleurbaey; F. Maniquet

doi:10.1007/s00199-006-0132-4

Fair social orderings

M. Fleurbaey
, F. Maniquet

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › peer-review

24 Scopus citations

Abstract

In a model of private good allocation, we construct social orderings which depend only on ordinal non-comparable information about individual preferences. In order to avoid Arrovian-type impossibilities, we let those social preferences take account of the shape of individual indifference curves. This allows us to introduce equity and cross-economy robustness properties, inspired by the theory of fair allocation. Combining such properties, we characterize two families of fair social orderings.

Original language	English (US)
Pages (from-to)	25-45
Number of pages	21
Journal	Economic Theory
Volume	34
Issue number	1
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-006-0132-4
State	Published - Jan 2008
Externally published	Yes

All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes

Economics and Econometrics

Keywords

Fairness
Social orderings

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10.1007/s00199-006-0132-4

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title = "Fair social orderings",

abstract = "In a model of private good allocation, we construct social orderings which depend only on ordinal non-comparable information about individual preferences. In order to avoid Arrovian-type impossibilities, we let those social preferences take account of the shape of individual indifference curves. This allows us to introduce equity and cross-economy robustness properties, inspired by the theory of fair allocation. Combining such properties, we characterize two families of fair social orderings.",

keywords = "Fairness, Social orderings",

author = "M. Fleurbaey and F. Maniquet",

note = "Funding Information: We thank E. Maskin, A. Sen, W. Thomson, B. Tungodden and an anonymous referee for comments, and seminar participants at the Indian Statistical Institute-Delhi, the Norwegian School of Economics (Bergen), the University of Caen, the University of Rochester, and the University of Cergy-Pontoise. Financial Support from European TMR Network Living Standards, Inequality and Taxation Contract ERBFMXCT 980248 is gratefully acknowledged.",

year = "2008",

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doi = "10.1007/s00199-006-0132-4",

language = "English (US)",

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journal = "Economic Theory",

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T1 - Fair social orderings

AU - Fleurbaey, M.

AU - Maniquet, F.

N1 - Funding Information: We thank E. Maskin, A. Sen, W. Thomson, B. Tungodden and an anonymous referee for comments, and seminar participants at the Indian Statistical Institute-Delhi, the Norwegian School of Economics (Bergen), the University of Caen, the University of Rochester, and the University of Cergy-Pontoise. Financial Support from European TMR Network Living Standards, Inequality and Taxation Contract ERBFMXCT 980248 is gratefully acknowledged.

PY - 2008/1

Y1 - 2008/1

N2 - In a model of private good allocation, we construct social orderings which depend only on ordinal non-comparable information about individual preferences. In order to avoid Arrovian-type impossibilities, we let those social preferences take account of the shape of individual indifference curves. This allows us to introduce equity and cross-economy robustness properties, inspired by the theory of fair allocation. Combining such properties, we characterize two families of fair social orderings.

AB - In a model of private good allocation, we construct social orderings which depend only on ordinal non-comparable information about individual preferences. In order to avoid Arrovian-type impossibilities, we let those social preferences take account of the shape of individual indifference curves. This allows us to introduce equity and cross-economy robustness properties, inspired by the theory of fair allocation. Combining such properties, we characterize two families of fair social orderings.

KW - Fairness

KW - Social orderings

UR - https://www.scopus.com/pages/publications/35248892880

UR - https://www.scopus.com/pages/publications/35248892880#tab=citedBy

U2 - 10.1007/s00199-006-0132-4

DO - 10.1007/s00199-006-0132-4

M3 - Article

AN - SCOPUS:35248892880

SN - 0938-2259

VL - 34

SP - 25

EP - 45

JO - Economic Theory

JF - Economic Theory

IS - 1

ER -

Fair social orderings

Abstract

All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes

Keywords

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