Fair social orderings when agents have unequal production skills

Marc Fleurbaey, François Maniquet

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

40 Scopus citations


We develop an approach which escapes Arrow's impossibility by relying on information about agents' indifference curves instead of utilities. In a model where agents have unequal production skills and different preferences, we characterize social ordering functions which rely only on ordinal non-comparable information about individual preferences. These social welfare functions are required to satisfy properties of compensation for inequalities in skills, and equal access to resources for all preferences.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)93-127
Number of pages35
JournalSocial Choice and Welfare
Issue number1
StatePublished - Feb 2005
Externally publishedYes

All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes

  • Social Sciences (miscellaneous)
  • Economics and Econometrics


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