Fair social orderings

M. Fleurbaey, F. Maniquet

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

22 Scopus citations


In a model of private good allocation, we construct social orderings which depend only on ordinal non-comparable information about individual preferences. In order to avoid Arrovian-type impossibilities, we let those social preferences take account of the shape of individual indifference curves. This allows us to introduce equity and cross-economy robustness properties, inspired by the theory of fair allocation. Combining such properties, we characterize two families of fair social orderings.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)25-45
Number of pages21
JournalEconomic Theory
Issue number1
StatePublished - Jan 2008
Externally publishedYes

All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes

  • Economics and Econometrics


  • Fairness
  • Social orderings


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