Fair Retirement Under Risky Lifetime

Marc Fleurbaey, Marie Louise Leroux, Pierre Pestieau, Gregory Ponthiere

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

7 Scopus citations

Abstract

A premature death unexpectedly brings a life and a career to their end, leading to substantial welfare losses. We study the retirement decision in an economy with risky lifetime and compare the laissez-faire with egalitarian social optima. We consider two social objectives: (1) the maximin on expected lifetime welfare, allowing for a compensation for unequal life expectancies, and (2) the maximin on realized lifetime welfare, allowing for a compensation for unequal lifetimes. The latter optimum involves, in general, decreasing lifetime consumption profiles as well as raising the retirement age. This result is robust to the introduction of unequal life expectancies and unequal productivities.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)177-210
Number of pages34
JournalInternational Economic Review
Volume57
Issue number1
DOIs
StatePublished - Feb 1 2016

All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes

  • Economics and Econometrics

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    Fleurbaey, M., Leroux, M. L., Pestieau, P., & Ponthiere, G. (2016). Fair Retirement Under Risky Lifetime. International Economic Review, 57(1), 177-210. https://doi.org/10.1111/iere.12152