Exploiting Trust for Resilient Hypothesis Testing with Malicious Robots

Matthew Cavorsi, Orhan Eren Akgun, Michal Yemini, Andrea J. Goldsmith, Stephanie Gil

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference contribution

3 Scopus citations

Abstract

We develop a resilient binary hypothesis testing frame-work for decision making in adversarial multi-robot crowdsensing tasks. This framework exploits stochastic trust observations between robots to arrive at tractable, resilient decision making at a centralized Fusion Center (FC) even when i) there exist malicious robots in the network and their number may be larger than the number of legitimate robots, and ii) the FC uses one-shot noisy measurements from all robots. We derive two algorithms to achieve this. The first is the Two Stage Approach (2SA) that estimates the legitimacy of robots based on received trust observations, and provably minimizes the probability of detection error in the worst-case malicious attack. Here, the proportion of malicious robots is known but arbitrary. For the case of an unknown proportion of malicious robots, we develop the Adversarial Generalized Likelihood Ratio Test (A-GLRT) that uses both the reported robot measurements and trust observations to estimate the trustworthiness of robots, their reporting strategy, and the correct hypothesis simultaneously. We exploit special problem structure to show that this approach remains computationally tractable despite several unknown problem parameters. We deploy both algorithms in a hardware experiment where a group of robots conducts crowdsensing of traffic conditions on a mock-up road network similar in spirit to Google Maps, subject to a Sybil attack. We extract the trust observations for each robot from actual communication signals which provide statistical information on the uniqueness of the sender. We show that even when the malicious robots are in the majority, the FC can reduce the probability of detection error to 30.5% and 29% for the 2SA and the A-GLRT respectively.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Title of host publicationProceedings - ICRA 2023
Subtitle of host publicationIEEE International Conference on Robotics and Automation
PublisherInstitute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers Inc.
Pages7663-7669
Number of pages7
ISBN (Electronic)9798350323658
DOIs
StatePublished - 2023
Event2023 IEEE International Conference on Robotics and Automation, ICRA 2023 - London, United Kingdom
Duration: May 29 2023Jun 2 2023

Publication series

NameProceedings - IEEE International Conference on Robotics and Automation
Volume2023-May
ISSN (Print)1050-4729

Conference

Conference2023 IEEE International Conference on Robotics and Automation, ICRA 2023
Country/TerritoryUnited Kingdom
CityLondon
Period5/29/236/2/23

All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes

  • Software
  • Control and Systems Engineering
  • Electrical and Electronic Engineering
  • Artificial Intelligence

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