Executive Underreach, in Pandemics and Otherwise

David E. Pozen, Kim Lane Scheppele

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

40 Scopus citations

Abstract

Legal scholars are familiar with the problem of executive overreach, especially in emergencies. But sometimes, instead of being too audacious or extreme, a national executive's attempts to address a true threat prove far too limited and insubstantial. In this Essay, we seek to define and clarify the phenomenon of executive underreach, with special reference to the COVID-19 crisis; to outline ways in which such underreach may compromise constitutional governance and the international legal order; and to suggest a partial remedy.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)608-617
Number of pages10
JournalAmerican Journal of International Law
Volume114
Issue number4
DOIs
StatePublished - Oct 1 2020

All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes

  • Political Science and International Relations
  • Law

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