Exact Implementation

Dilip Abreu, Hitoshi Matsushima

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

30 Scopus citations

Abstract

We study implementation of social choice functions when the planner can randomize and impose arbitrarily small fines on players. In complete information environments with three or more players, it is shown that any social choice function is exactly implementable in iteratively weakly undominated strategies. The mechanisms used are finite and robust to the order of removal of dominated strategies. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: C72, D78, D82.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)1-19
Number of pages19
JournalJournal of Economic Theory
Volume64
Issue number1
DOIs
StatePublished - Oct 1 1994

All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes

  • Economics and Econometrics

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