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Evolutionary stability in a reputational model of bargaining
Dilip Abreu, Rajiv Sethi
Economics
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Article
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peer-review
22
Scopus citations
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Keyphrases
Evolutionary Stability
100%
Rational Player
66%
Stability Criteria
33%
Irrationality
33%
Equilibrium Behavior
33%
Behavioral Types
33%
Joint Limits
33%
Boundedly Rational
33%
Mathematics
Stability Criteria
100%
Irrationality
100%
Economics, Econometrics and Finance
Stability Criteria
100%