Evolutionary game dynamics in finite populations

Christine Taylor, Drew Fudenberg, Akira Sasaki, Martin A. Nowak

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

352 Scopus citations


We introduce a model of stochastic evolutionary game dynamics in finite populations which is similar to the familiar replicator dynamics for infinite populations. Our focus is on the conditions for selection favoring the invasion and/or fixation of new phenotypes. For infinite populations, there are three generic selection scenarios describing evolutionary game dynamics among two strategies. For finite populations, there are eight selection scenarios. For a fixed payoff matrix a number of these scenarios can occur for different population sizes. We discuss several examples with unexpected behavior.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)1621-1644
Number of pages24
JournalBulletin of Mathematical Biology
Issue number6
StatePublished - Nov 2004

All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes

  • General Environmental Science
  • General Biochemistry, Genetics and Molecular Biology
  • General Neuroscience
  • General Agricultural and Biological Sciences
  • Pharmacology
  • Computational Theory and Mathematics
  • Immunology
  • General Mathematics


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