Evolutionary game dynamics in finite populations

Christine Taylor; Drew Fudenberg; Akira Sasaki; Martin A. Nowak

doi:10.1016/j.bulm.2004.03.004

Evolutionary game dynamics in finite populations

Christine Taylor, Drew Fudenberg, Akira Sasaki, Martin A. Nowak

Mathematics

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › peer-review

360 Scopus citations

Abstract

We introduce a model of stochastic evolutionary game dynamics in finite populations which is similar to the familiar replicator dynamics for infinite populations. Our focus is on the conditions for selection favoring the invasion and/or fixation of new phenotypes. For infinite populations, there are three generic selection scenarios describing evolutionary game dynamics among two strategies. For finite populations, there are eight selection scenarios. For a fixed payoff matrix a number of these scenarios can occur for different population sizes. We discuss several examples with unexpected behavior.

Original language	English (US)
Pages (from-to)	1621-1644
Number of pages	24
Journal	Bulletin of Mathematical Biology
Volume	66
Issue number	6
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1016/j.bulm.2004.03.004
State	Published - Nov 2004

All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes

General Environmental Science
General Biochemistry, Genetics and Molecular Biology
General Neuroscience
General Agricultural and Biological Sciences
Pharmacology
Computational Theory and Mathematics
Immunology
General Mathematics

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10.1016/j.bulm.2004.03.004

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AU - Nowak, Martin A.

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AB - We introduce a model of stochastic evolutionary game dynamics in finite populations which is similar to the familiar replicator dynamics for infinite populations. Our focus is on the conditions for selection favoring the invasion and/or fixation of new phenotypes. For infinite populations, there are three generic selection scenarios describing evolutionary game dynamics among two strategies. For finite populations, there are eight selection scenarios. For a fixed payoff matrix a number of these scenarios can occur for different population sizes. We discuss several examples with unexpected behavior.

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Evolutionary game dynamics in finite populations

Abstract

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