Evolutionary game dynamics in finite populations

Christine Taylor, Drew Fudenberg, Akira Sasaki, Martin A. Nowak

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

270 Scopus citations

Abstract

We introduce a model of stochastic evolutionary game dynamics in finite populations which is similar to the familiar replicator dynamics for infinite populations. Our focus is on the conditions for selection favoring the invasion and/or fixation of new phenotypes. For infinite populations, there are three generic selection scenarios describing evolutionary game dynamics among two strategies. For finite populations, there are eight selection scenarios. For a fixed payoff matrix a number of these scenarios can occur for different population sizes. We discuss several examples with unexpected behavior.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)1621-1644
Number of pages24
JournalBulletin of Mathematical Biology
Volume66
Issue number6
DOIs
StatePublished - Nov 1 2004

All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes

  • Neuroscience(all)
  • Immunology
  • Mathematics(all)
  • Biochemistry, Genetics and Molecular Biology(all)
  • Environmental Science(all)
  • Pharmacology
  • Agricultural and Biological Sciences(all)
  • Computational Theory and Mathematics

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    Taylor, C., Fudenberg, D., Sasaki, A., & Nowak, M. A. (2004). Evolutionary game dynamics in finite populations. Bulletin of Mathematical Biology, 66(6), 1621-1644. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.bulm.2004.03.004