Evolutionary escape from the prisoner's dilemma

Lee Worden; Simon A. Levin

doi:10.1016/j.jtbi.2006.10.011

Evolutionary escape from the prisoner's dilemma

Lee Worden, Simon A. Levin

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › peer-review

51 Scopus citations

Abstract

The classic prisoner's dilemma model of game theory is modified by introducing occasional variations on the options available to players. Mutation and selection of game options reliably change the game matrix, gradually, from a prisoner's dilemma game into a byproduct mutualism one, in which cooperation is stable, and "temptation to defect" is replaced by temptation to cooperate. This result suggests that when there are many different potential ways of interacting, exploring those possibilities may make escape from prisoner's dilemmas a common outcome in the world. A consequence is that persistent prisoner's dilemma structures may be less common than one might otherwise expect.

Original language	English (US)
Pages (from-to)	411-422
Number of pages	12
Journal	Journal of Theoretical Biology
Volume	245
Issue number	3
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jtbi.2006.10.011
State	Published - Apr 7 2007

All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes

General Immunology and Microbiology
Applied Mathematics
General Biochemistry, Genetics and Molecular Biology
General Agricultural and Biological Sciences
Statistics and Probability
Modeling and Simulation

Keywords

Adaptive dynamics
Agent-based models
Agent-based simulation
Byproduct cooperation
Byproduct mutualism
Complex systems
Cultural evolution
Division of labor game
Evolution of cooperation
Evolutionary game theory
Prisoner's dilemma
Tragedy of the commons

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10.1016/j.jtbi.2006.10.011

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title = "Evolutionary escape from the prisoner's dilemma",

abstract = "The classic prisoner's dilemma model of game theory is modified by introducing occasional variations on the options available to players. Mutation and selection of game options reliably change the game matrix, gradually, from a prisoner's dilemma game into a byproduct mutualism one, in which cooperation is stable, and {"}temptation to defect{"} is replaced by temptation to cooperate. This result suggests that when there are many different potential ways of interacting, exploring those possibilities may make escape from prisoner's dilemmas a common outcome in the world. A consequence is that persistent prisoner's dilemma structures may be less common than one might otherwise expect.",

keywords = "Adaptive dynamics, Agent-based models, Agent-based simulation, Byproduct cooperation, Byproduct mutualism, Complex systems, Cultural evolution, Division of labor game, Evolution of cooperation, Evolutionary game theory, Prisoner's dilemma, Tragedy of the commons",

author = "Lee Worden and Levin, {Simon A.}",

note = "Funding Information: This work was funded by a Department of Energy Computational Science Graduate Fellowship, by the Sloan and Mellon foundations, and by a Ciriacy-Wantrup Postdoctoral Fellowship. Conversations with Junling Ma, Jonathan Dushoff, Joshua Plotkin, Stefan Geritz, Derrick Jensen, Peter Richerson, and Richard Norgaard have been especially helpful. We are grateful for the help of Narin Dickerson, Trevor Lango, Jerry Vigil, Matthew Tom, Stephen Fung, Jesse Edelstein, and two anonymous reviewers. SAL thanks Harvard's Program in Evolutionary Dynamics for its hospitality in 2006. Copyright: Copyright 2008 Elsevier B.V., All rights reserved.",

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doi = "10.1016/j.jtbi.2006.10.011",

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AU - Levin, Simon A.

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PY - 2007/4/7

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N2 - The classic prisoner's dilemma model of game theory is modified by introducing occasional variations on the options available to players. Mutation and selection of game options reliably change the game matrix, gradually, from a prisoner's dilemma game into a byproduct mutualism one, in which cooperation is stable, and "temptation to defect" is replaced by temptation to cooperate. This result suggests that when there are many different potential ways of interacting, exploring those possibilities may make escape from prisoner's dilemmas a common outcome in the world. A consequence is that persistent prisoner's dilemma structures may be less common than one might otherwise expect.

AB - The classic prisoner's dilemma model of game theory is modified by introducing occasional variations on the options available to players. Mutation and selection of game options reliably change the game matrix, gradually, from a prisoner's dilemma game into a byproduct mutualism one, in which cooperation is stable, and "temptation to defect" is replaced by temptation to cooperate. This result suggests that when there are many different potential ways of interacting, exploring those possibilities may make escape from prisoner's dilemmas a common outcome in the world. A consequence is that persistent prisoner's dilemma structures may be less common than one might otherwise expect.

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KW - Agent-based models

KW - Agent-based simulation

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KW - Byproduct mutualism

KW - Complex systems

KW - Cultural evolution

KW - Division of labor game

KW - Evolution of cooperation

KW - Evolutionary game theory

KW - Prisoner's dilemma

KW - Tragedy of the commons

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Evolutionary escape from the prisoner's dilemma

Abstract

All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes

Keywords

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