Evolution and information in a gift-giving game

Philip Johnson; David K. Levine; Wolfgang Pesendorfer

doi:10.1006/jeth.2001.2823

Evolution and information in a gift-giving game

Philip Johnson, David K. Levine, Wolfgang Pesendorfer

Economics

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › peer-review

25 Scopus citations

Abstract

We examine the stochastic stability of a process of learning and evolution in a gift-giving game. Overlapping generations of players are randomly matched to play the game. They may consult information systems to learn about the past behavior of their opponents. If the value of the gift is smaller than twice the cost, then gifts are not given. If the value of the gift is more than four times the cost, then gifts are exchanged. Moreover, in the stochastically stable equilibrium, a unique information system is selected to support cooperation. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: C62, C72, D83.

Original language	English (US)
Pages (from-to)	1-21
Number of pages	21
Journal	Journal of Economic Theory
Volume	100
Issue number	1
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1006/jeth.2001.2823
State	Published - 2001

All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes

Economics and Econometrics

Keywords

Evolution
Information
Learning
Repeated games
Stochastic stability

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10.1006/jeth.2001.2823

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title = "Evolution and information in a gift-giving game",

abstract = "We examine the stochastic stability of a process of learning and evolution in a gift-giving game. Overlapping generations of players are randomly matched to play the game. They may consult information systems to learn about the past behavior of their opponents. If the value of the gift is smaller than twice the cost, then gifts are not given. If the value of the gift is more than four times the cost, then gifts are exchanged. Moreover, in the stochastically stable equilibrium, a unique information system is selected to support cooperation. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: C62, C72, D83.",

keywords = "Evolution, Information, Learning, Repeated games, Stochastic stability",

author = "Philip Johnson and Levine, {David K.} and Wolfgang Pesendorfer",

note = "Funding Information: 1We are grateful to financial support from National Science Foundation Grant SBR-93-20695 and the UCLA Academic Senate. We are especially grateful to two anonymous referees and an associate editor, whose comments led to a major rethinking of the model.",

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AU - Levine, David K.

AU - Pesendorfer, Wolfgang

N1 - Funding Information: 1We are grateful to financial support from National Science Foundation Grant SBR-93-20695 and the UCLA Academic Senate. We are especially grateful to two anonymous referees and an associate editor, whose comments led to a major rethinking of the model.

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N2 - We examine the stochastic stability of a process of learning and evolution in a gift-giving game. Overlapping generations of players are randomly matched to play the game. They may consult information systems to learn about the past behavior of their opponents. If the value of the gift is smaller than twice the cost, then gifts are not given. If the value of the gift is more than four times the cost, then gifts are exchanged. Moreover, in the stochastically stable equilibrium, a unique information system is selected to support cooperation. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: C62, C72, D83.

AB - We examine the stochastic stability of a process of learning and evolution in a gift-giving game. Overlapping generations of players are randomly matched to play the game. They may consult information systems to learn about the past behavior of their opponents. If the value of the gift is smaller than twice the cost, then gifts are not given. If the value of the gift is more than four times the cost, then gifts are exchanged. Moreover, in the stochastically stable equilibrium, a unique information system is selected to support cooperation. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: C62, C72, D83.

KW - Evolution

KW - Information

KW - Learning

KW - Repeated games

KW - Stochastic stability

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Evolution and information in a gift-giving game

Abstract

All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes

Keywords

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