Equilibrium selection in global games with strategic complementarities

David M. Frankel, Stephen Morris, Ady Pauzner

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

115 Scopus citations

Abstract

We study games with strategic complementarities, arbitrary numbers of players and actions, and slightly noisy payoff signals. We prove limit uniqueness: as the signal noise vanishes, the game has a unique strategy profile that survives iterative dominance. This generalizes a result of Carlsson and van Damme (Econometrica 61 (1993) 989-1018) for two-player, two-action games. The surviving profile, however, may depend on fine details of the structure of the noise. We provide sufficient conditions on payoffs for there to be noise-independent selection.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)1-44
Number of pages44
JournalJournal of Economic Theory
Volume108
Issue number1
DOIs
StatePublished - Jan 1 2003

All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes

  • Economics and Econometrics

Keywords

  • Equilibrium selection
  • Global games
  • Strategic complementarities
  • Supermodular games

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