Abstract
This paper presents the results of experimental games with multiple Nash equilibria in which subjects were given suggestions for their play. This procedure allows for a direct test of the self-enforcement condition implicit in the Nash equilibrium concept. The results show that perfectness has cutting power in simple single-stage games. Also, off-equilibrium payoffs influence subjects′ behavior. For two-stage games we find support for the position that subgame perfect equilibria are strategically stable and weak support for the concept of forward induction. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Number: 215.
| Original language | English (US) |
|---|---|
| Pages (from-to) | 36-63 |
| Number of pages | 28 |
| Journal | Games and Economic Behavior |
| Volume | 11 |
| Issue number | 1 |
| DOIs | |
| State | Published - Oct 1995 |
| Externally published | Yes |
All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes
- Finance
- Economics and Econometrics