Equilibrium selection in experimental games with recommended play

Jordi Brandts, W. Bentley Macleod

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

48 Scopus citations

Abstract

This paper presents the results of experimental games with multiple Nash equilibria in which subjects were given suggestions for their play. This procedure allows for a direct test of the self-enforcement condition implicit in the Nash equilibrium concept. The results show that perfectness has cutting power in simple single-stage games. Also, off-equilibrium payoffs influence subjects′ behavior. For two-stage games we find support for the position that subgame perfect equilibria are strategically stable and weak support for the concept of forward induction. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Number: 215.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)36-63
Number of pages28
JournalGames and Economic Behavior
Volume11
Issue number1
DOIs
StatePublished - Oct 1995
Externally publishedYes

All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes

  • Finance
  • Economics and Econometrics

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