Energy-efficient resource allocation in wireless networks with quality-of-service constraints

Farhad Meshkati, H. Vincent Poor, Stuart C. Schwartz, Radu V. Balan

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

83 Scopus citations


A game-theoretic model is proposed to study the cross-layer problem of joint power and rate control with quality of service (QoS) constraints in multiple-access networks. In the proposed game, each user seeks to choose its transmit power and rate in a distributed manner in order to maximize its own utility while satisfying its QoS requirements. The user's QoS constraints are specified in terms of the average source rate and an upper bound on the average delay where the delay includes both transmission and queuing delays. The utility function considered here measures energy efficiency and is particularly suitable for wireless networks with energy constraints. The Nash equilibrium solution for the proposed non-cooperative game is derived and a closed-form expression for the utility achieved at equilibrium is obtained. It is shown that the QoS requirements of a user translate into a "size" for the user which is an indication of the amount of network resources consumed by the user. Using this competitive multiuser framework, the tradeoffs among throughput, delay, network capacity and energy efficiency are studied. In addition, analytical expressions are given for users' delay profiles and the delay performance of the users at Nash equilibrium is quantified.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Article number5336862
Pages (from-to)3406-3414
Number of pages9
JournalIEEE Transactions on Communications
Issue number11
StatePublished - Nov 2009

All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes

  • Electrical and Electronic Engineering


  • Admission control
  • Cross-layer design
  • Delay
  • Energy efficiency
  • Game theory
  • Nash equilibrium
  • Power and rate control
  • Quality of service


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