TY - JOUR
T1 - Endogenous Taxation in Ongoing Internal Conflict
T2 - The Case of Colombia
AU - Ch, Rafael
AU - Shapiro, Jacob
AU - Steele, Abbey
AU - Vargas, Juan F.
N1 - Funding Information:
CH RAFAEL SHAPIRO JACOB STEELE ABBEY VARGAS JUAN F. New York University Princeton University University of Amsterdam Universidad del Rosario Rafael Ch is a Graduate Student, New York University , Wilf Family Department of Politics , 19 West 4th St. , Room 230 , New York , NY 10009 ( rafael.ch@nyu.edu ). Jacob Shapiro is a Professor of Politics and International Affairs, Princeton University , Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs , Princeton , NJ 08544 ( jns@princeton.edu ). Abbey Steele is an Assistant Professor, University of Amsterdam , Department of Political Science. Nieuwe Achtergracht 166 , 1018 WV Amsterdam (REC B building) ( A.A.Steele@uva.nl ). Juan F. Vargas is a Professor of Economics, Universidad del Rosario , School of Economics , Calle 12C No 4 - 69 , Of. 315 , Bogotá ( juan.vargas@urosario.edu.co ). We benefited tremendously from excellent comments by Fernando Álvarez, Mario Chacón, Ursula Daxecker, Leopoldo Fergusson, Patrick Kuhn, Livia Schubiger, Pablo Sanguinetti, and seminar participants at CAF’s RED 2015 Workshop in Buenos Aires, the 2015 Empirical Studies of Conflict (ESOC) Annual Meeting, the Uppsala University Research Seminar, the conflict seminar at Konstanz University, the Amsterdam Conflict Club, and the 2017 Subnational State in Latin America Conference at the University of Amsterdam. We acknowledge generous funding from CAF-Development Bank of Latin America, ONR through Grant No. N000141310097, and AFOSR through Grant No. FA9550-09-1-0314. Dario Salcedo provided superb research assistance. Replication material is available on the American Political Science Review Dataverse: https://doi.org/10.7910/DVN/PCM2O2 . 11 2018 03 08 2018 112 4 996 1015 04 08 2017 01 02 2018 30 05 2018 Copyright © American Political Science Association 2018 2018 American Political Science Association Recent empirical evidence suggests an ambiguous relationship between internal conflicts, state capacity, and tax performance. In theory, internal conflict should create strong incentives for governments to develop the fiscal capacity necessary to defeat rivals. We argue that one reason that this does not occur is because internal conflict enables groups with de facto power to capture local fiscal and property rights institutions. We test this mechanism in Colombia using data on tax performance and property rights institutions at the municipal level. Municipalities affected by internal conflict have tax institutions consistent with the preferences of the parties dominating local violence. Those suffering more right-wing violence feature more land formalization and higher property tax revenues. Municipalities with substantial left-wing guerrilla violence collect less tax revenue and witness less land formalization. Our findings provide systematic evidence that internal armed conflict helps interest groups capture municipal institutions for their own private benefit, impeding state-building. pdf S0003055418000333a.pdf
Publisher Copyright:
Copyright © American Political Science Association 2018.
PY - 2018/11/1
Y1 - 2018/11/1
N2 - Recent empirical evidence suggests an ambiguous relationship between internal conflicts, state capacity, and tax performance. In theory, internal conflict should create strong incentives for governments to develop the fiscal capacity necessary to defeat rivals. We argue that one reason that this does not occur is because internal conflict enables groups with de facto power to capture local fiscal and property rights institutions. We test this mechanism in Colombia using data on tax performance and property rights institutions at the municipal level. Municipalities affected by internal conflict have tax institutions consistent with the preferences of the parties dominating local violence. Those suffering more right-wing violence feature more land formalization and higher property tax revenues. Municipalities with substantial left-wing guerrilla violence collect less tax revenue and witness less land formalization. Our findings provide systematic evidence that internal armed conflict helps interest groups capture municipal institutions for their own private benefit, impeding state-building.
AB - Recent empirical evidence suggests an ambiguous relationship between internal conflicts, state capacity, and tax performance. In theory, internal conflict should create strong incentives for governments to develop the fiscal capacity necessary to defeat rivals. We argue that one reason that this does not occur is because internal conflict enables groups with de facto power to capture local fiscal and property rights institutions. We test this mechanism in Colombia using data on tax performance and property rights institutions at the municipal level. Municipalities affected by internal conflict have tax institutions consistent with the preferences of the parties dominating local violence. Those suffering more right-wing violence feature more land formalization and higher property tax revenues. Municipalities with substantial left-wing guerrilla violence collect less tax revenue and witness less land formalization. Our findings provide systematic evidence that internal armed conflict helps interest groups capture municipal institutions for their own private benefit, impeding state-building.
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U2 - 10.1017/S0003055418000333
DO - 10.1017/S0003055418000333
M3 - Article
AN - SCOPUS:85052639502
SN - 0003-0554
VL - 112
SP - 905
EP - 917
JO - American Political Science Review
JF - American Political Science Review
IS - 4
ER -