Efficient auctions and interdependent types

Dirk Bergemann; Stephen Morris; Satoru Takahashi

doi:10.1257/aer.102.3.319

Efficient auctions and interdependent types

Dirk Bergemann, Stephen Morris, Satoru Takahashi

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › peer-review

Original language	English (US)
Pages (from-to)	319-324
Number of pages	6
Journal	American Economic Review
Volume	102
Issue number	3
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1257/aer.102.3.319
State	Published - 2012

All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes

Economics and Econometrics

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10.1257/aer.102.3.319

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title = "Efficient auctions and interdependent types",

author = "Dirk Bergemann and Stephen Morris and Satoru Takahashi",

year = "2012",

doi = "10.1257/aer.102.3.319",

language = "English (US)",

volume = "102",

pages = "319--324",

journal = "American Economic Review",

issn = "0002-8282",

publisher = "American Economic Association",

number = "3",

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T1 - Efficient auctions and interdependent types

AU - Bergemann, Dirk

AU - Morris, Stephen

AU - Takahashi, Satoru

PY - 2012

Y1 - 2012

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DO - 10.1257/aer.102.3.319

M3 - Article

AN - SCOPUS:84863206932

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VL - 102

SP - 319

EP - 324

JO - American Economic Review

JF - American Economic Review

IS - 3

ER -

Efficient auctions and interdependent types

All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes

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