Economics of electric vehicle charging: A game theoretic approach

Wayes Tushar, Walid Saad, H. Vincent Poor, David B. Smith

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

208 Scopus citations

Abstract

In this paper, the problem of grid-to-vehicle energy exchange between a smart grid and plug-in electric vehicle groups (PEVGs) is studied using a noncooperative Stackelberg game. In this game, on the one hand, the smart grid, which acts as a leader, needs to decide on its price so as to optimize its revenue while ensuring the PEVGs' participation. On the other hand, the PEVGs, which act as followers, need to decide on their charging strategies so as to optimize a tradeoff between the benefit from battery charging and the associated cost. Using variational inequalities, it is shown that the proposed game possesses a socially optimal Stackelberg equilibrium in which the grid optimizes its price while the PEVGs choose their equilibrium strategies. A distributed algorithm that enables the PEVGs and the smart grid to reach this equilibrium is proposed and assessed by extensive simulations. Further, the model is extended to a time-varying case that can incorporate and handle slowly varying environments.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Article number6295695
Pages (from-to)1767-1778
Number of pages12
JournalIEEE Transactions on Smart Grid
Volume3
Issue number4
DOIs
StatePublished - Sep 10 2012

All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes

  • Computer Science(all)

Keywords

  • Electric vehicles
  • energy exchange
  • energy management
  • game theory
  • power system economics
  • smart grids

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