TY - GEN
T1 - Eavesdropping and jamming in next-generation wireless networks
T2 - 2011 IEEE Military Communications Conference, MILCOM 2011
AU - Zhu, Quanyan
AU - Saad, Walid
AU - Han, Zhu
AU - Poor, H. Vincent
AU - Basar, Tamer
N1 - Copyright:
Copyright 2012 Elsevier B.V., All rights reserved.
PY - 2011
Y1 - 2011
N2 - The efficient design of next-generation wireless systems faces multifaceted problems involving a variety of node types such as wireless users, relay stations, base stations, eavesdroppers, and jammers. In this paper, the complex decision making processes between a network of wireless users that perform uplink transmission via relay stations and an active malicious node, that is able to act as an eavesdropper and as a jammer, is studied. A noncooperative game in which the users and the malicious node are the players is formulated. On the one hand, the users seek to choose the relay station that maximizes their utilities which reflect their mutual interference as well as the security of the chosen path. On the other hand, the objective of the malicious node is to choose whether to eavesdrop, jam, or use a combination of both strategies, in a way to reduce the total network capacity. To solve the game, a fictitious play-based algorithm is proposed using which the users and the malicious node reach a mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium. Simulation results show that the proposed approach improves the average expected utility per user up to 49.4% relative to a nearest neighbor algorithm. The results also show how the malicious node can strategically decide on whether to jam or eavesdrop depending on its capabilities and objectives.
AB - The efficient design of next-generation wireless systems faces multifaceted problems involving a variety of node types such as wireless users, relay stations, base stations, eavesdroppers, and jammers. In this paper, the complex decision making processes between a network of wireless users that perform uplink transmission via relay stations and an active malicious node, that is able to act as an eavesdropper and as a jammer, is studied. A noncooperative game in which the users and the malicious node are the players is formulated. On the one hand, the users seek to choose the relay station that maximizes their utilities which reflect their mutual interference as well as the security of the chosen path. On the other hand, the objective of the malicious node is to choose whether to eavesdrop, jam, or use a combination of both strategies, in a way to reduce the total network capacity. To solve the game, a fictitious play-based algorithm is proposed using which the users and the malicious node reach a mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium. Simulation results show that the proposed approach improves the average expected utility per user up to 49.4% relative to a nearest neighbor algorithm. The results also show how the malicious node can strategically decide on whether to jam or eavesdrop depending on its capabilities and objectives.
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U2 - 10.1109/MILCOM.2011.6127463
DO - 10.1109/MILCOM.2011.6127463
M3 - Conference contribution
AN - SCOPUS:84856969548
SN - 9781467300810
T3 - Proceedings - IEEE Military Communications Conference MILCOM
SP - 119
EP - 124
BT - 2010 Military Communications Conference, MILCOM 2010
Y2 - 7 November 2011 through 10 November 2011
ER -